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In light of the well-known empirical failures of the one-factor CAPM, mutual-fund per-
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In this paper we introduce momentum and size factors into the picture, and evaluate the 
performance of a large set of equity funds managed in Belgium.  There is a  fairly strong 
exposure to the small-firm effect, but the evidence of momentum chasing is less clear-cut 
and, if  anything, seems to be negative.  As in other studies, the average fund underperforms. 
Nor do we find any instances of excess performance when grouping funds by management 
company. 
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Introduction 
To date, the most popular measures of mutual-fund performance still are the Sharpe ratio 
(Sharpe,  1964)  and Jensen's alpha (Jensen 1968,  1969)-despite the empirical criticisms 
of the one-factor asset-pricing model that underlies these measures.  In academe, and in-
creasinglyalso in industry, the observed failings of the one-factor model have led to more 
sophisticated evaluation procedures that, however,  still retain the spirit of the original: 
multi-factor Capital Asset Pricing Models, Arbitrage Asset Pricing Theory, or Stochastic 
Discount Factor models, all reviewed in e.g.  Sercu (2000).  These models can also be used 
to identify the style of the fund-that is, the niches the fund shuns or over-invests in, for 
example large stocks, or distressed firms, and so on-provided that suitable style-indices 
are introduced as yardsticks. 
This paper illustrates how the addition of even just two factors considerably changes the 
picture, fund by fund.  The exposures to the factors imply that, in a larger sample (or one 
where factor mean returns do not happen to be close to zero) also the average performance 
across fund will be substantially affected.  In what follows we first review, very briefly, the 
competing one- and multifactor models and the resulting yardsticks.  We then present the 
results from our three-factor analysis and contrast them with the one-factor counterparts 
(Section 2).  Section 3 concludes. 
1  Yardsticks for  Mutual-Fund Performance 
The notation we adopt is the following.  R stands for the return, that is, the simple percent-
age change in the value of the asset or portfolio over a time period.  Subscript f to R refers 
to a particular mutual fund.  Subscript 0 refers to the zero-risk asset (a T-bill, or a high-
quality CD or bank deposit).  A tilde n  over the R (or over another symbol)  means that 
the variable is random (or "risky"). E(RJ) is the unconditional expected (risky) return on 
the fund over an unspecified period-the unconditional probability-weighted average of all 
possible outcomes. Expected returns can and do change over time.  Thus, Et-l(R/,t), refers Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  2 
to the return over a period t (say, March 2003), as it is (or was) expected at time t -1, the 
beginning of that period, on the basis of all then available information.  Thus,Et-l(Rt,t), 
is the conditional expected (risky) return on the fund over a specified period-the condi-
tional probability-weighted average of all possible outcomes. We use var(RJ) to denote the 
variance, and std(RJ) (that is,  vvar(RJ)) to denote the standard deviation of the fund's 
return. Lastly, the excess return of fund f  is defined to be (RJ - Ro), that is, its return in 
excess of the risk-free rate. 
We first  review the one-factor-CAPM performance measures.  Familiarly, the Sharpe 
ratio is the fund's expected excess return scaled for risk by dividing by its standard devi-
ation, and Jensen's alpha is the mean excess return left unexplained by the asset's market 
sensitivity or beta: 
Sharpe Ratio 
Jensen's alpha 
E(RJ) - Ro 
std(RJ) 
Et-l(RJ,t - Ro,t) - (3J,t-lEt-l(RM,t - Ro,t) 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
where {3j,t-l is the slope of a regression of RJ,t - Ro,t on RM,t - Ro,t.  In  practice, the alpha is 
obtained by assuming the beta in (1.2) to be constant over time, running an OLS regression 
with an intercept OtJ  added, and testing whether OtJ  is clearly non-zero (and, preferably, 
positive). 
Both performance measures  are based on "mean-variance"  portfolio theory and the 
resulting one-factor Capital Asset  Pricing Model (CAPM1).  Relative to Sharpe's ratio, 
Jensen's alpha has the major advantage that it can be logically applied to any individual 
asset,  not just to the investor's entire portfolio.  Still, the alpha is far from perfect yet. 
First, the CAPM1 assumes a mean-variance world, which is problematic both a priori and 
empirically.  The CAPM indeed predicts that differences in expected  returns should be 
explained by differences in beta and by nothing else, but this turns out to be empirically 
untrue.  1  One major "anomaly"  is size:  in the past, the smallest stocks have on average 
outperformed the return predicted on the basis of their beta, and the logarithm of the 
market capitalization turns out to be a better predictor of mean returns than the OLS beta. 
Related anomalies are the Price/Earnings and book-to-market factors:  the low-P /E stocks 
outperform what one would have expected on the basis of beta, and so do distressed stocks 
with a high book-to-market, that is,  a high ratio of book value to market value.  Another 
lFbr a review, see e.g.  Fama and French (1992). Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  3 
anomaly is short-term momentum:  short-term winners (that is, stocks that outperformed 
over the last 3-12 months) tend to go on winning, while short-term losers tend to go on 
losing.  Lastly,  and statistically more ambiguous,  there may also be a long-term reversal 
phenomenon:  stocks that badly underperformed the market over the past five years tend 
to provide unusually high returns and vice versa. 
Initially these phenomena were viewed  by many to reflect  market inefficiencies.  Yet 
they could also be rational priced factors.  The theoretical existence of such additional fac-
tors, beside the market portfolio, was first suggested in the intertemporal CAPM of Merton 
(1973):  expected excess returns should be determined by assets' sensitivities to more port-
folios than just the market portfolio if the additional portfolios stand for underlying factors 
that change the investment opportunity set.2  Somewhat more pragmatically, however, the 
existence of the"  anomalies" does mean that the portfolio manager may achieve" abnormal" 
returns (that is, a positive alpha) by simply chasing the anomalies.  That is, the manager 
may simply be investing into small stocks or low-PIE firms, etc.  rather than being good at 
picking individual stocks.  Multifactor-based measures of performance do attempt to sort 
out this effect. 
Such multi-factor or multi-index models can also be used to identify the fund's style. In 
"style analysis", first promoted by Sharpe (1992), one regresses the fund's excess returns 
(as of now denoted by TJ  == RJ - Ro) on the excess returns from N market-segment indices. 
A general style-analysis regression with benchmarks bi, ... , b n  can be written as 
(1.3) 
For instance, the benchmarks used in Sharpe's website are (i) S&P firms with a large market 
capitalization ("cap") and a high book-to-marketj  (ii) S&P firms with a large cap and a 
low book-to-marketj (iii) mid-cap firms (that is, the larger non-S&P stocks)j (iv) small-cap 
non-S&P firmsj  (v) long-term Government bonds (20 years)j and (vi) long-term corporate 
bonds.  Regressions like (1.3)  tell us, firstly,  what kind of stocks the fund has been really 
after, possibly in contrast to its stated policy.  A second purpose of these regressions may 
be to take into account "significant" differences between returns in various segments of the 
2In a multi-period setting, investors logica.1ly care not just about the mean and variance of wealth at the 
end of  the current period, but also about the conditions under which they will be able to re-invest afterwards 
(the "investment opportunity set").  Business cycles, or changes in macro uncertainty obviously do change 
the investment opportunity set;  and smaller firms or distressed firms with high book-to-market are more 
sensitive to business cycles or changes in macro uncertainty. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  4 
market.3  Lastly, one could view the expected-value version of (1.3) as a multi-factor CAPM, 
and use the intercept Otf as the multifactor generalization of Jensen's abnormal return. 
Regarding the choice of factors, US studies usually fall back on the extensive tests of 
multifactor CAPMs by Fama and French (1996),  who conclude that the following  three 
factors do a good job in describing/explaining asset returns:  i'M, the excess return on the 
value-weighted market portfolio M; SB, the small-minus-big factor or size factor [return on 
the smallest stocks, minus return on the biggest stocks]; and HL, the high versus low book-
to-market value factor [return on high book-to-market stocks, minus return on low book-to-
market stocks].  These factors, however, fail to explain the expected returns on momentum-
specialized portfolios.  Accordingly, recent studies like Carhart (1997)  add a fourth factor 
that should capture this continuation phenomenon: Mo, the momentum factor, [return on 
short-term winners, minus return on short-term losers].  For an exploratory study as ours, 
we dropped the HL factor,  which requires hard-to-find accounting data (practical issue). 
Moreover Crombez (2001) finds that European equity is better priced by models including 
Mo and SB than models with HL (empirical issue).  Thus, our regression is 
(1.4) 
2  A three-factor evaluation of Belgian Mutual funds. 
2.1  Data selection 
We use three years of data, January 1999 till December 2001, from Datastream, obtained 
as follows: 
•  Mutual Funds.  We use the (USD) returns of all 322 international equity funds that are 
sold in Belgium and Luxemburg, are listed as such in the De Collectieve beleggingen in 
Belgie 2001,  Beleggingsfondsen en Beleggingsvennootschappen, and have alleast twelve 
months of data.  They represent 26 different fund-management firms.  Starting from a 
SSuppose, for instance, that the one-factor CAPM holds but that, during a particular period, the bond 
market did quite well while stocks did unusually poorly.  Regressing bond-fund excess returns on a market 
excess return that comprises both stocks and bonds would then misleadingly suggest that the bond-fund 
managers were very clever (their alpha is positive); lilrewise, stock-fund managers would look undeservedly 
bad. One could try to handle this by regressing stock-fund returns on a pure stock-market index, and bond-
fund returns on a pure bond-market index, but this would be incompatible with the CAPM (which says that 
covariance with the entire market of stocks and bonds is what matters). It can be shown that including into 
the regression both segments (the one the fund is going into, and the remaining part of the market) is an 
appropriate procedure. That, of course, is what style analysis does. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  5 
list of funds that existed in the middle of the period, we  might miss funds that had 
gone under in 1999-2000, but in view of the booming market in those years the risk of 
survival selection bias is  small.  Anyway,  the focus  is on the importance of the three-
factor evaluation.  We report no individual names of funds nor of managing firms:  we 
find little systematic evidence of differential stock-picking abilities across managers, and 
we want to avoid our numbers being quoted selectively without our warning that any 
differences are probably unreliable for the purpose of diagnosing the past and, a fortiori, 
predicting the future  . 
•  Market  and Small-Big Returns.  The CAPM logic  suggests that we take a worldwide 
index as the benchmark.  4  Our index is Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
which now covers 95 percent of the aggregate market cap of all stocks.  With respect to 
the size and momentum factors, we take into account the manifest home bias observed 
by others.  Hoping to pick portfolios that best reflect opportunity sets relevant for  the 
European stocks that our funds largely invest in,  the BB return factor is constructed 
from the returns on two European indices, Dow-Jones' STOXX Total Market Index Large 
Cap and on the DJ STOXX TMI Small Cap.  All these indices are total-return indices, 
that is, they compute values with reinvestment of the dividends.  The Large and Small 
indices are based on free-float caps; DJ STOXX TMI Large consists of firms from the 
70 percent biggest-cap segment, and the corresponding Small index from the smallest-
but-one 5-percent segment, that is,  the firms between the 90th and 95th percentiles of 
all firms ranked downward by size.  The composition of each index is revised quarterly. 
The returns are taken from Datastream  . 
•  Momentum.  The momentum factor was constructed as follows.  First, we extract the 
data of 2657 individual stocks from Datastream.  Datastream has the drawback that 
it omits the smaller firms,  and also  removes  all delisted firms  from  its current files, 
4Early applications of the CAPM, mostly on US  data, consistently use a US  index as  the basis of the 
benchmarking exercise.  This procedure implicitly views  the US  as  a closed  market, with local  investors 
choosing just local stocks and with all local stocks being US-held.  While this was not unreasonable for the 
US  in the 70s,  for post-19oo European markets it is  an untenable assumption:  we  all hold many foreign 
stocks, and many domestic stocks are held abroad. In internationally integrated markets, the market should 
be the world market, as shown in the International CAPM by Sercu (1980).  True, for funds dedicated to just 
one country or one industry, a local or industry index would have generated higher R2s.  Still, the purpose 
is not high R2s but a theoretically sound and coherent approach.  Equally true, the real exchange rates that 
should enter as additional InCAPM factors are missing in this study, but evidence that mainstream-currency 
risk-free assets have different expected returns in the long run is skimpy. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  6 
thus potentially creating a severe survival bias.5  There is nothing we can do against the 
large-firm bias in Datastream-there is no reason to suspect that a large-firm bias affects 
momentum anyway-but we do try to tackle the survival bias, as follows.  We take firms 
from Datastream's "market list" until we have covered 80 percent of the market cap. We 
then look at Datastream's so-called "dead list", compute average market values of those 
firms, and select vanished firms until we also cover 80 percent of that list.  This way we 
end up with our 2657 stocks.  For every month in the sample we then proceed as follows. 
We compute each stock's return over the past six months, rank all returns, and pick up 
the 25  percent top and bottom performers.  M  0  is then computed as the return on an 
equally weighted portfolio of winners minus the return on an equally weighted portfolio 
of losers. 
2.2  Empirical results (1): stock-picking ability on the whole and by fund 
manager 
Panel A of Table 1 provides a summary of the parameter estimates and their t-statistics. As 
descriptive non-parametric statistics we show the lowest, midway (or median), and highest 
numbers. The usual parametric ingredients are also present: the mean, standard deviation, 
and the t-statistic on the mean, computed as avg  /std *  v'N with N = 322 being the number 
of funds in the current sample.  For every parameter we thus have (i) a t-test on the mean of 
the estimated parameter and (ii) a t-test on the mean of the t-statistics of that estimator. 
In principle, the t-test on the mean of t-tests is more reliable than the direct t-test on the 
mean of the parameters, because the former underweighs low-quality estimates and relies 
relatively more on the more precise numbers.6  A potential weakness of either t-test is that 
it assumes independence of the observations in the sample.  With respect to selectivity 
(at), one could argue that there could be a downward bias in the standard deviations due 
to possible commonalities in all funds run by the same managing firm.  Thus, both t-tests 
would be overstating the significance since the standard deviation for the mean would be 
underestimated.  Lastly, we compute the returns for two alternative portfolios of all mutual 
5If firms  are mainly delisted because they go bankrupt or are taken over under distress circumstances, 
then a data base that contains just survivors would never notice the bad returns on deceased  firms  and, 
therefore, overestimate the normal returns. 
8In practice we find no systematic difference between the two sets of t-tests on averages.  Perhaps there is 
little difference in the precision of the estimates across funds, and/or the tests are rather weak at assessing 
any quality differences present in the results. Fund Performance,  Size & Momentum 
Table 1: 1-factor evaluation: market, SB, and momentum sensitivities and 
average abnormal returns 
1't =  at +  f3t1'M,t +  "ItSEt +  8tMo +  €t,t. 
Panel A:  Summary statistics for 322 individual evaluations 
a(%)  f3  "I  8  t(a)  t(f3)  t("()  t(8)  fl2 
min  -4.089  -0.828  -1.162  -1.020  -3.269  -1.775  -2.647  -5.665  -0.141 
med  -0.111  0.996  0.353  -0.050  -0.151  4.797  1.237  -0.340  0.580 
max  6.319  4.003  2.157  0.898  4.678  22.704  5.272  3.427  0.955 
avg  -0.096  1.080  0.442  -0.059  -0.140  5.082  1.365  -0.411  0.536 
std  1.092  0.607  0.486  0.251  0.992  3.501  1.324  1.534  0.241 
t(av)  -1.881  31.913  16.334  -4.218  -2.525  26.047  18.505  -4.805 
Panel B:  Statistics for aggregate funds 
weight  a(%)  f3  "I  8  t(a)  t(f3)  t("()  t(8)  fl2 
equal  -0.261  1.119  0.031  -0.100  -0.598  8.071  0.295  -1.697  0.808 
-1 
var(:tf  -0.146  0.929  -0.010  -0.009  -0.451  8.983  -0.122  0.044  0.870 
7 
Key to Table 1.  Panel A. Monthly excess returns,  1999-2001, on 322  Belgian-managed internationally 
oriented stock funds are regressed on the world market excess return Tm (MSCI), a small-minus-large return 
factor BB (DJ STOXX Small minus DJ STOXX Large), and a momentum return Mo (the 25% best winners 
VS. the 25% worst losers over the past six months, taken from a sample of over 2500 individual European 
stocks).  p,  'Y,  and 0 estimate the fund's sensitivity to these factors.  a  estimates the average return that is 
not explained by any of these factors,  and is in percent per month.  Min stands for lowest estimate, med 
for  Median (the centrally ranked estimate), avg for average, max for  highest, std for  standard deviation, 
and t(av) for (avg/std)· v'N.  Note that std/v'N, on average, underestimates the standard deviation of the 
mean, so the t-test on averages and on t-tests overstate the significance.  Panel B.  The evaluation is done 
on a fund of funds,  growing from  193  (early 1999)  to 322  (end 2001).  The first  fund-of-funds  has equal 
weighting, in the second the individual funds are weighted inversely proportional to the estimation variance 
of their alpha in the first-pass regression reported in Panel A. The t-statistics are based on OLS assumptions 
and ignore the fall in residual risk when the number of investments grows from 193 tot 322; that is, the tests 
again overstate the significance. 
funds, and evaluate each of those fund-of-funds in the same way as genuine funds.  The two 
funds-of-funds differ in the way the individual funds are weighted.  In the first portfolio, we 
weight equally, thus giving each manager an equal importance.  In the second we weight 
each fund inversely proportional to its variance of alpha as obtained from the individual 
regressions, thus giving more reliable estimates more weight.7 
Let us turn to the alpha and t-alpha columns in Table 1, the measures of the managers' 
stock-picking abilities net of costs. In line with about every large-scale study on the mutual-
fund industry, we find that the average abnormal return-here the return not explained by 
1The (impractical but) theoretically superior scheme is to use weights w = 0-lU/(U'0-lU) where 0  is 
the 322 x 322 residual variance-covariance matrix across the regresSions and u the unit vector.  Weighting 
by inverse variance, as we do, ignores the off-diagonai elements, which makes the weighting less efficient but 
does not invalidate the t-statistic. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  8 
the general market, the size factor, and momentum-is negative; that is, from the point of 
view of the mutual-fund shareholder, the typical fund subtracts rather than adds value.8 
The net loss is about one-tenth of a percentage per month, that is, roughly one percent per 
year, so it is quite likely that before trading expenses and management fees the performance 
was about zero or even mildly positive. 
However-and comforting to the fund manager willing to ignore the ample prior evidence 
on negative alphas-in this study there are doubts about the statistical significance of the 
negative net outcome:  the t-test on the average is only marginally pessimistic (t(a)  = 
-1.88), and while the t  of the t's is downright negative (t(t(a))  =  -2.53), it is  likely 
to overstate the significance of the estimate.  The results by managing group are similar. 
Specifically, when we focus on the groups that run at least 30 funds and, therefore, make 
it possible to do some reliable statistical work (Table 2), we find that not a single group 
has a statistical significant positive estimated alpha, and two out of six have a substantially 
negative t(t(a)), again making it unlikely that the typical fund has a positive alpha.  But 
also these t-tests overstate the significance.  The regressions on the two alternative fund-of-
funds, lastly, show alpha's that are more negative in absolute size (a = -0.261 and - 0.146 
percent per month, Table 1) but nevertheless statistically unclear. 
Before we proceed, a brief comment on Table 2.  The table shows also that the worst 
performer in terms of t(t(a)), group 2,  is easily beaten by group 3 when we look at the 
actual size of the underperformance. That is, the significance here also has to do with the 
comparatively high precision of the estimates which, in turn, stems from the high amount 
of diversification: group 2 has the highest average R2 across management companies. Still, 
one would expect egregious alphas especially among loose-gun funds that seem to bear little 
relation to market-wide factors. When we look at that relation in general, there indeed turns 
out to be a statistically unambiguous negative relation across funds between the square of 
alpha and R-squared:  both the extremely high- and low-alpha funds tend to have low R-
squareds (that is, they take on lots of risks unexplained by market, size, or momentum), 
while the middle-of-the-road performers tend to take on far less stock- or niche-specific 
risks.  We hasten to add that this negative relation is less strong than we had expected (the 
correlation between a2 and R2 is just -0.11, and so is the correlation between I  a I  and R2.) 
Let's return to the alphas in Table 1.  The mean alphas of about one percent per year 
8This is not to say that the shareholder is worse off than if  (s)he had invested directly into the market. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum 
Table 2:  Summary statistics for the largest managers' market, SB, and 
momentum sensitivities and their average abnormal returns 
a(%)  (3  'Y  6 I t(a)  t((3)  t(f)  t(6)  fl2 
manager 1 
avg  -0.043  1.03  0.41  -0.12  -0.04  4.70  Ll9  -0.61  0.50 
std  1.044  0.62  0.58  0.26  1.08  2.83  1.40  1.61  0.24 
t(av)  -0.276  11.00  4.67  -3.18  -0.26  11.04  5.64  -2.53  -
manager 2 
avg  -0.244  1.21  0.27  -0.08  -0.33  7.30  0.99  -0.62  0.62 
std  0.943  0.70  0.50  0.27  0.93  4.76  1.53  1.69  0.26 
t(av)  -1.657  11.09  3.50  -1.97  -2.28  9.82  4.13  -2.36  -
manager 3 
avg  -0.420  1.21  0.59  -0.12  -0.43  5.50  1.83  -0.83  0.53 
std  1.499  0.62  0.51  0.26  1.21  2.47  1.35  1.76  0.19 
t(av)  -1.610  1Ll8  6.66  -2.68  -2.03  12.76  7.77  -2.70  -
manager 4 
avg  -0.079  1.06  0.59  -0.04  -0.05  4.44  1.52  0.01  0.45 
std  1.029  0.75  0.55  0.27  0.82  2.99  1.28  1.57  0.23 
t(av)  -0.566  10.42  7.88  -1.08  -0.43  10.90  8.71  0.05  -
manager 5 
avg  0.169  1.01  0.52  -0.02  0.07  3.29  1.52  -0.31  0.56 
std  1.136  0.40  0.32  0.27  1.02  2.07  1.11  1.46  0.28 
t(av)  0.866  14.77  9.37  -0.52  0.40  9.26  7.98  -1.22  -
manager 6 
avg  0.106  1.23  0.51  -0.14  -0.03  6.16  1.72  -Ll3  0.57 
std  1.082  0.54  0.44  0.13  LlO  3.29  1.47  0.99  0.16 
t(av)  0.393  9.09  4.67  -4.59  -0.12  7.49  4.67  -4.55  -
9 
Key to Table 2. Monthly excess returns, 1999-2001, on 322 Belgian-managed internationally oriented stock 
funds are regressed on the world market excess return rm (MSCI), a small-minus-Iarge return factor BB (DJ 
STOXX Small minus DJ STOXX Large), and a momentum return Mo (the 25% best winners VB. the 25% 
worst losers over the past six months, taken from a sample of over 2500 individual European stocks).  (3,  ,,(, 
and Ii estimate the fund's sensitivity to these factors.  a  estimates the average return that is not explained 
by any of these factors.  Avg stands for average, std for standard deviation, and t(  av) for (avg/  std) . .../N. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  10 
Table 3: Frequency distributions of estimated parameters and t  ratios, 322 
funds 
parameter estimates 
class  a(%)  freq  cuml  (3  freq  cuml  I  freq  cumi  8  freq  cuml 
1  -3.477  1  0.6  -0.54  0  0.3  -0.97  1  0.6  -0.91  1  0.6 
2  -2.865  3  1.6  -0.26  1  0.6  -0.77  3  1.6  -0.79  1  0.9 
3  -2,253  4  2.8  0.02  6  2.5  -0.58  0  1.6  -0.68  5  2.5 
4  -1.641  12  6.5  0.31  17  7.8  -0.38  0  1.6  -0.57  4  3.7 
5  -0.196  26  14.6  0.59  23  14.9  -0.19  10  4.7  -0.46  4  5.0 
6  -0.416  64  34.5  0.88  72  37.3  0.01  33  14.9  -0.34  17  10.3 
7  0.196  109  68.3  1.16  91  65.5  0.20  57  32.6  -0.23  27  18.6 
8  0.808  59  86.7  1.45  41  78.3  0.40  71  54.7  -0.12  64  38.5 
9  1.420  21  93.2  1.73  37  89.8  0.59  40  67.1  0.00  67  59.3 
10  2.032  13  97.2  2.01  9  92.6  0.79  37  78.6  0.11  61  78.3 
11  2.644  4  98.5  2.30  7  94.7  0.99  27  87.0  0.22  49  93.5 
12  3.256  2  99.1  2.58  8  97.2  1.18  22  93.8  0.33  9  96.3 
13  3.869  2  99.7  2.87  7  99.4  1.38  8  96.3  0.45  2  96.9 
14  4.481  0  99.7  3.15  0  99.4  1.57  2  96.9  0.56  4  98.1 
15  5.053  0  99.7  3.43  0  99.4  1.77  3  97.8  0.67  2  99.1 
t statistics 
class  t(a)  freq  cuml  t((3)  freq  cuml  tb)  freq  cuml  t(8)  freq  cuml 
1  -2.80  0  0.3  -0.34  5  1.9  -2.18  0  0.3  -5.13  1  0.6 
2  -2.33  1  0.6  1.10  20  8.1  -1.72  3  1.2  -4.60  1  0.9 
3  -1.87  10  3.7  2.54  61  27.0  -1.25  2  1.9  -4.06  2  1.6 
4  -1.40  20  9.9  3.98  50  42.6  -0.78  9  4.7  -3.53  2  2.2 
5  -0.93  30  19.3  5.42  49  57.8  -0.32  12  8.4  -2.99  13  6.2 
6  -0.46  48  34.2  6.86  50  73.3  0.15  28  17.1  -2.46  10  9.3 
7  0.00  73  56.8  8.30  44  87.0  0.61  39  29.2  -1.92  16  14.3 
8  0.47  67  77.6  9.74  17  92.2  1.08  42  42.2  -1.39  30  23.6 
9  0.94  36  88.8  11.18  9  95.0  1.55  53  58.7  -0.85  42  36.7 
10  1.41  19  94.7  12.62  6  96.9  2.01  35  69.6  -0.32  44  50.3 
11  1.87  8  97.2  14.06  2  97.5  2.48  29  78.6  0.22  53  66.8 
12  2.34  3  98.1  15.50  3  98.5  2.94  30  87.9  0.75  34  77.3 
13  2.81  2  98.8  16.94  1  98.8  3.41  16  92.9  1.29  23  84.5 
14  3.28  1  99.1  18.38  3  99.7  3.87  13  96.9  1.82  27  92.9 
15  4.74  2  99.7  19.82  0  99.7  4.34  4  98.1  2.89  6  99.7 
Key to Table 3. Monthly excess returns, 1999-2001, on 322 Belgian-managed internationally oriented stock 
funds are regressed on the world market excess return Tm (MSCI), a small-minus-large return factor SB (DJ 
STOXX Small minus DJ STOXX Large), and a momentum return Mo (the 25% best winners VB. the 25% 
worst losers over the past six months, taken from a sample of over 2500 individual European stocks).  p, 'Y, 
and 0 estimate the fund's sensitivity to these factors.  a  estimates the average return that is not explained 
by any of these factors, and is in percent per month. Freq stands for absolute frequency, cum! for cumulative 
relative (percentage) frequency. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  11 
hide a degree of variety that would have astounded an investor in the 70s.  From Table 1, the 
range between the best and worst performer is a whopping ten percent per month-and this 
is a clifference between average monthly returns, not month-by-month or per annum ones. 
From Table 2,  about one fund in seven has an ex post alpha that differs from zero by at 
least 1.5 percent per month, that is, about 20 percent per annum. In line with this, R2s are 
now much lower than they used to be.  The average is 50 percent, while R2s in e.g.  OOIDS, 
Sercu and Vanthienen (1976) are all above 70 percent and occasionally reach 90 percent. It 
is equally a sign of the times that our estimated betas range between minus unity and plus 
four, a far cry from the 0.65-1.1 range found in e.g.  OOIDS,  Sercu and Vanthienen (1976). 
The factor sensitivities are the topic of the next subsection. 
2.3  Empirical results (2):  exposures & styles 
Despite the wide range of estimated market sensitivities (13),  the mean is close to unity (Ta-
ble 1:  1.080), as one would expect. The fact that the average 13  actually somewhat exceeds 
unity is due to right-skewness (the presence of a few extremely large numbers): the median 
beta in Table 1, 0.996, implies that very close to half of the betas ~e  below unity; and about 
ten percent of the funds have betas exceeding 1.73 (Table 3).  The right-skewness probably 
means that some funds were heavily overweight in the boom-and-bust leT sectors.9  Above-
average market sensitivity is a characteristic of the two worst-performing groups (groups 
2 and 3 in Table 2), but this may be a fluke:  group 6, with the highest average market 
exposure, actually has an above-average alpha. 
The average exposure to small-minus-big, gamma, is estimated to be positive (Table 1: 
0.442), and quite significantly so.  That is, the average fund goes for smaller firms.  We also 
find this for each of the six individual fund-management groups reported in Table 2.  Table 
3 shows that about 85  percent of the firms  have positive gammas;  and for  the minority, 
with negative gamma estimates, the significance is dubious. While there is no doubt about 
the pervasiveness and significance of positive exposure to the small-firm effect, it is far from 
clear what this positive gamma means:  it could be a standard home bias (Belgian firms 
are small by international standards), or an overweight in small dotcoIDS, or a conservative 
9To some extent the extreme betas could be caused by multicollinearity between Rm and BB (p=O.75). 
But that seems to be no major problem:  when we compare the betas in Table 1 to the one-factor betas in 
Table 4, we find that the latter, even though free from multicollinearity-induced imprecision, actually have 
a somewhat higher cross-sectional standard deviation. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  12 
underweight in the (then) bloated ICT giants, or a predilection for  a size class where more 
inefficiencies can be expected.  More research is called for  here.  At any rate, the finding 
belies the conventional wisdom that most funds are index-chasers or obsessed with liquidity. 
Exposure to momentum, lastly, is negative on average (Table 1:  -0.059).  The effect is, 
however,  the least pervasive of all the exposure patterns discussed so far.  Although the 
t-ratio for the general average is significant (Table 1:  -4.218), in Table 2 we find a clearly 
negative mean for four out of six management groups only;  and in Table 3 a mere fifteen 
percent of the individual deltas are significantly negative by themselves.  The mixed picture 
may mean that behaviour is different across funds.  However, at least part of the explanation 
is that the momentum return is a much lower-impact signal than the market return or the 
BB factor;  and low-impact signals are, of course, hard to pick up and nail down precisely. 
The properties of the BB and momentum factors are the subject of the next section. 
2.4  Empirical results (3):  do BB and Mo affect benchmark returns? 
Our finding, in the previous section, that funds are exposed to additional factors beside the 
market return does not in itself mean that fund ratings obtained from a three-factor CAPM 
would differ systematically from ratings derived from a one-factor CAPM: average returns 
on the additional factor  portfolios may be zero in the sample period.  A more indirect 
mechanism by which the introduction of factors  could  affect  normal returns is that the 
multivariate beta may differ from the univariate one, provided, of course, that the market 
risk premium is  non-zero.  Mathematically,  this happens if and only if the new factors 
are not market-neutral.  True, the BB and Mo variables are zero-investment portfolios, or 
swaps if  you like, with both the long and a short leg fully invested in stocks.  However, in 
the past, small stocks tend to have higher betas than large ones, so BB is likely to be not 
quite market-neutral after all.1O  Let's explore each aspect. 
Table 4 shows some relevant summary statistics on the three factors.  Strikingly, none of 
the three factors has a mean return that is unambiguously different from zero;  the market 
return is slightly negative, momentum-chasing did not pay either, and small-v-big yielded 
only marginally positive results. Thus, in this (small) sample the two mechanisms that may 
lOThere also is an uncertain impact on the power of the t-test on alpha.  On the one hand the inclusion of 
more factors lowers the residual standard error which, in itself, increases the power of the t-test on a.  On 
the other hand, the estimation uncertainty about two  more regression slopes reduces the precision of the 
estimated intercept. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  13 
Table 4: Three- versus One-factor performance evaluation 
distribution of factors  1'f =  af +  (3f™,t +  ff,t 
Tm  BB  Mo  a  t(a)  (3  t((3) 
min  -10.803  -9.729  -21.418  -5.861  -6.61  -0.91  -2.79 
med  -1.967  -2.528  -2.892  -0.13  -0.21  0.95  5.43 
max  7.104  14.889  14.060  26.247  7.49  8.01  26.31 
avg  -0.609  1.079  -2.249  -0.104  -0.23  1.05  6.33 
std  4.720  5.763  7.789  1.919  1.140  0.678  4.356 
t  -0.76  1.11  -1.71  -0.97  -3.67  27.84  26.18 
Pl  -0.06  -0.10  0.21 
(3  1.00  -0.87  0.08 
Key to table 4:  The left-hand-side panel of the table summarizes the distributions of the three factors 
(lowest, midway, and highest value, average, standard deviation, t=avg!  std * .;eN), first-order correlation 
(111)  and the betas of SB and Mo.  The factors are the world  market excess return rm (MSCI), a small-
minus-large return factor SB (DJ STOXX Small minus DJ STOXX Large), and a momentum return Mo 
(the 25% best winners VB. the 25% worst losers over the past six months, taken from a sample of over 2500 
individual European stocks).  The right-hand side provides statistics on estimated alphas and betas in a 
standard one-factor performance evaluation:  monthly excess returns, 1999-2001, on 322 Belgian-managed 
internationally oriented stock funds are regressed on the world market excess return rm.  All returns in the 
first panel, and the alphas, are in percent per month. 
make a  three-factor evaluation different from a one-factor version were to a  large extent 
neutralized. Not surprisingly, then, when we look at the mean and median of the one-factor 
alpha we see almost no difference relative to the three-factor counterparts in Table 1.  The 
net effect on the t-tests, lastly, is mixed:  t(a) improves, but t(t(a)) weakens.  But we still 
find a significant underperformance after trading costs and other management expenses. 
Should we conclude that, in general, adding BB and Mo or other factors will make no 
difference?  Probably not. First, the beta of BB is an impressive -0.87, implying that if  the 
market return had been clearly non-zero-which it is,  on average, in larger samples-the 
market factor would have been substantially confused with the BB one.ll For example, in 
the one-factor evaluations there is one outlier fund with a  26 percent alpha, resoundingly 
t-rated at 7.49.  The three-factor evaluation realizes that this is to a large extent a BB effect, 
and substantially lowers the alpha estimate. This is, of course, an extreme individual case. 
However, even on average there will,  normally, be effects:  in the long run the evidence is 
that small firms do clearly better than large ones, implying that the observed predilection 
for small firms ought to be accounted for in the benchmark return; and if  B  B  remains not 
llThe negative sign of SB's (3  is a surprise, though.  It explains why our univariate beta is  below our 
multivariate one. On the basis of past international research we would have expected the opposite patterns. Fund Performance, Size & Momentum  14 
market-neutral, then in a sample with a non-zero market return we should disentangle true 
market sensitivity from indirect market sensitivity via BB. 
3  Conclusion 
Looking at a  large number of Belgian-managed equity funds,  we  find  that the average 
estimated alpha is  negative to the tune of about (-) 1 percent per year,  but statistically 
ambiguously so.  Looking at the larger fund-management groups as separate subsamples, 
we  find  that most of them similarly score below zero.  Our conclusion is independent of 
whether we  apply one- or three-factor evaluations.  That last finding,  however,  is  likely 
to be sample-specific;  in larger samples,  the conclusions can be expected to differ.  The 
main reason is that BB is far from market-neutral, and funds are clearly loading positively 
on BB.  Thus,  when each factor  has a  positive risk premium,  we  ought to disentangle 
the sensitivities.  With respect to momentum, the exposures are less clear, but the same 
argument might apply.  And even in our sample, where the average alphas happen to be 
similar, knowledge of an individual fund's one-factor alpha explains a mere 16 percent of 
the variance of its three-factor score.  In short, the additional factors matter. 
Still, our study is exploratory in several respects.  First, we have no large-scale survey 
on what factors were relevant and successful in explaining passive, static style portfolios. 
Book-to-market,  for  instance,  and exchange rates are missing.  Second,  we  do not know 
what the funds' positive exposure on BB stands for:  home bias (Belgian firms are small), or 
dot-com gambles, or ICT aversion.  Third, it is not obvious what the negative momentum 
exposure means (provided it holds up in larger samples at all):  timely cutting of losses, 
or premature profit-taking.  Lastly, the sample period (confined to the still brief life of DJ 
STOXX) is quite short. 
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